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purchase the property at First South and State Streets. There
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE B. STONE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation, J. BRACKEN LEE, JOE L. CHRISTENSON, L. C. ROMNEY, T. I.
GEURTS and J. K. PIERCEY, its Commissioners, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, and
GUS P. BACKMAN, its Secretary,
ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION,
a corporation, and THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a corporation

Case No.
9268

sole

'
Defendants and Respondents.
LYNN FAUSETT and FIAMETTA
FAUSETT,
Petitioners in Intervention and Appellants^

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Comes now Appellant and respectfully petitions this
Honorable Court to grant a Rehearing in the above entitled
1
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cause upon the grounds and for the reasons that the Court
erred in the following particulars:
1. That the statement of the purposes of the action as
set out in the opinion is inaccurate, in that, plaintiff seeks to
secure a judgment granting him the following relief:
(a) That the purported bid of the Chamber of Commerce
made for the purchase of the property at First South and State
Streets be declared null and void;
(b) That the acceptance of said purported bid be declared null and void;
(c) That Salt Lake City be enjoined from entering into
a contract whereby it agrees to convey the above described
tract of land to the Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce, or
to the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, or to Zions Securities Corporation;
(d) That defendant, Salt Lake City and its Commissioners, be enjoined from conveying the City property above described to anyone until it has provided facilities for its officers
and employees while engaged in the governmental function
of the City;
(e) That neither defendant, Zions Securities Corporation,
nor defendant Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, may purchase a site for the
erection of a Federal Building, nor use any of their assets in
payment of the purchase price thereof.
(f) Plaintiff also prays for general relief.
2. That the Court erred in stating that the Salt Lake City
Chamber of Commerce, and persons representing the interests

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the Church, were desirous of cooperating with the Federal
Government to obtain a suitable site for the building in downtown Salt Lake City rather than for it to build on land wholly
owned by the Government on the Fort Douglas Military Reservation at the eastern outskirts of the City.
The pleadings show that Mr. Backman, while representing
the Church, solicited the United States Government to purchase
the property at First South and State Streets. There is nothing
in the pleadings from which it may be concluded that the
United States owned any land on the Fort Douglas Reservation
on which it intended to construct a Federal Building.
3. That the Court erred in stating that the agreement to
purchase the Lafayette School site was held in abeyance, and
that it was decided it would be better to locate the new Federal
Building on property owned by the City. It is alleged in the
Complaint that the Lafayette School site was conveyed to
Zions Securities Corporation prior to the time this action was
commenced and that said Zions Securities Corporation continues to be the owner thereof for the purpose of erecting
thereon a Federal Building.
4. That the Court erred in confirming its opinion as to the
grounds upon which plaintiff attacked the transaction to A,
B, C and D mentioned on page 2 of the opinion, and in failing
to state that plaintiff attacked the transaction upon the ground
that such sale, if carried out, was contrary to and in violation
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, and of Section 22 of Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, which provides that private property shall not
be taken or damaged for a public use without just compensation.
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5. The Court erred in stating that plaintiff did not designate the purposes for which his donation to the Church was
given, and that, therefore, such donor has no right to direct
the manner in which the money so given shall be used merely
because he has made such contribution to the Church, or because
he is a member of a class which may be benefitted by the
carrying out of its purposes. That this is in accord with the
majority of the authorities.
6. That the Court erred in stating that there is no doubt
that the Church can legally purchase and sell property as any
other property owner, and it can use any legitimate means to
persuade a buyer to purchase from it, in that, while the Church
can sell property, there is no authority conferred upon the
Church is dispose of the property which it holds in trust for
the purpose of constructing a Federal Building, and the sale
here questioned is contrary to the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
16-7-6.
7. The Court erred in holding that no matter how great
the benefit to be derived, or the detriment to be suffered by
the Church in this transaction, neither would redound to the
benefit or detriment of the commissioners as individuals, and
further finding that:
"Thus the 'conflict of interest' reasons for borbidding contracts between the city and officials interested
in the subject matter does not exist here because it is
uniformly held that the 'interest' referred to in such
a statute means that the official must have a 'personal
and pecuniary interest' in the subject matter."
8. The Court erred in stating that:
"To assume that they (the commissioners) would
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betray their public trust and subvert the interests of the
City to those of the Church would require the conjecture that they are bent on wrongdoing and violating
their oaths of office. Such conjecture the law will not
indulge, but in the absence of a specific charge to the
contrary, right conduct is always presumed."
In such particular the Court in assuming that to hold the City
Commissioners were not disqualified from participating in
the transaction involved in this action unless they were guilty
of wrongdoing is contrary to the law applicable in such cases,
in that, the good or bad intentions of the City Commissioners
is immaterial. The statute makes them disqualified because of
the relation that exists between them and the party with whom
the contract is being made.
9. The Court erred in holding that the conflict of interest
reason for forbidding contracts between the City and officials
interested in the subject matter does not exist here because it
is uniformly held that the interest referred to in such statute
means that the officers must have a personal and pecuniary
interest in the subject matter. (As we read them the cited
authorities do not so hold.)
10. The Court erred in concluding that the application
of the extension of the Rule again conflict of interest applied
to the circumstances here shown would go far beyond the evils
against which it is directed, and would likely create evils of its
own.
11. The Court erred in concluding that membership in
the Church under the circumstances presented here does not
fall within and as being prohibited by Section 10-6-38, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12. The Court erred in holding that the provisions of
Section 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not apply
to a sale of the property here involved.
13. The Court erred in concluding that there is no allegation that there was any impropriety in the manner in which
the City property was sold.

Burton W. Musser

Elias Hansen
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant,
721-26 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
We, the undersigned, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, hereby certify that in our opinion there is merit to the
aforegoing Petition for Rehearing, and that in order to do
justice to the parties a rehearing should be granted, and the
errors complained of corrected.

Burton W. Musser

Elias Hansen

ARGUMENT
It may be that some of the alleged errors claimed by
Appellant to have been committed by the Court in the opinion
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heretofore written are not of controlling importance, but we
assume that if the errors complained of are meritorious, the
Court will welcome that the same be called to its attention
so that the same be corrected before they become the established
law in this jurisdiction.

POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENTS OF THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE CITY UNDERTOOK TO
SELL ITS PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE
STREETS, IN THAT THE ONLY BID IT HAD WAS BY
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY
WHICH CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT THE CITY
COULD CONVEY THE PROPERTY TO WHOMSOEVER
IT MIGHT DESIGNATE; THAT IF AND WHEN THE
PROPERTY WAS CONVEYED TO THE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE IT PLANNED TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT, ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION, WHICH IN TURN PLANNED TO CONVEX
THE PROPERTY TO THE UNITED STATES.
It is, of course, the established law that if there is such a
defect in the chain of title to real property so that the title
sought to be conveyed fails to pass from a grantor to a grantee
in chain of title, the ultimate grantee does not acquire title.
Thus, if the City is without authority to convey its property to
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Commerce is
without authority to convey the property to Zions Securities
Corporation, or Zions Securities Corporation is without authority to convey the property to the United States, then and under
7
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such a state of facts the United States will not acquire title
to the property. Thus, if the City was without authority to
convey the property, the title thereto remains in the City. We
have alleged facts which we claim are fatally defective in
passing title by the various conveyances, and if the alleged
facts are established, Appellant is entitled to prevail. We
shall discuss the legal effect of the various alleged defects
later in this Brief.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE SALT
LAKE CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND PERSONS
REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CHURCH
WERE DESIROUS OF COOPERATING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN A SUITABLE SITE
FOR THE BUILDING IN DOWNTOWN SALT LAKE
CITY RATHER THAN FOR IT TO BUILD ON LAND
WHOLLY OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE
FORT DOUGLAS MILITARY RESERVATION AT THE
EASTERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY.
It has been established law in this and other jurisdictions
generally that when an attack is made upon the sufficiency of
a complaint to state a cause of action, the court in passing
upon such an attack is confined to the facts alleged in the
complaint. It is alleged upon information and belief in paragraph 16 of the complaint that the bid made by Gus P. Backman
was so made at the solicitation of defendant, Corporation of
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
and its agent and owned defendant, Zions Securities Corpo-
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ration. There is nothing alleged in the complaint to the effect
that the United States owned any land on the Fort Douglas
Military Reservation upon which it intended to construct a
Federal Building. There is an allegation in the complaint
that defendant, Zion's Securities Corporation, acquired title
to the Lafayette School site for the purpose of having the same
conveyed to the United States for the purpose of having erected
thereon a Federal Building.
While we are not clear just what bearing some of the
matters discussed under this Point has upon the conclusions
reached by the Court, we assume the Court will joint with us in
an effort to have the opinion reflect the facts alleged in the
Complaint.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE THE LAFAYETTE SCHOOL
SITE WAS HELD IN ABEYANCE, AND THAT IT WAS
DECIDED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LOCATE THE
NEW FEDERAL BUILDING ON PROPERTY OWNED BY
THE CITY.
It is alleged in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the Complaint
that the Board of Education of Salt Lake City granted an option
to defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, to purchase the
Lafayette School site for $750,000.00 for the purpose of erecting thereon a Federal Building, that notwithstanding a Lis
Pendens was filed Zions Securities Corporation exercised the
Option, and is holding the title thereto with the apparent
purpose of erecting thereon a Federal Building. It is alleged
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in subsection paragraph 20(a) of the Complaint that only one
Federal Building is planned to be constructed in Salt Lake
City at this time, and that by reason of such fact Zions Securities Corporation is estopped from securing an additional site
for such purpose.
It may well be that neither the plaintiff nor the Fausetts
have sufficient ground for complaint, if as stated in the opinion,
the transaction touching the purchase of the Lafayette School
site was held in abeyance, but when $750,000.00 of the Trust
Fund held by the Corporation of the President and/or Zions
Securities Corporation for the use and benefit of the members
of the L.D.S. Church are used, to purchase a site for a Federal
Building, an entirely different situation is presented.
We shall have more to say about this phase of the case
later in this Brief. We at this time again refer the Court to
what is said and the authorities cited on page 50 of Appellant's
original Brief.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PASS ON THE
QUESTION RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 20(f) OF THE
COMPLAINT WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT TO
PERMIT THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND/OR ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION TO EXPEND FOR THE PURCHASE OF A SITE
FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING SEVERAL HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS OF THE TRUST FUND HELD
BY THEM FOR THE BENEFITS OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
10
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SAINTS WILL BE TO DEPRIVE THE BENEFICIARIES
OF SUCH FUNDS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION CONTRARY
TO SECTION 22 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
"It is a fundamental principle of the constitutional
system of government of the United States that the
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and
authoritative declaration as to the proper and correct
construction to be placed on the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and as to whether a state law
contravenes any provisions of the Federal Constitution." 11 Am. Jur. 740.
In footnotes to the foregoing quotation will be found
numerous cases of both federal and state courts of last resort
where the law above quoted has been applied. Ever since the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
famous case of Dartmouth College v. Woodman, 4 Wheat
(U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, it has been held the established law
uinformly adhered to that the legislative branch of government
may not deprive one of a vested interest in property without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. It is alleged in the
Complaint that defendant Corporation of the President and/or
defendant Zions Securities Corporation seek to expend several
hundred thousand dollars of the money held by them for the
benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints for the purpose of paying for the purchase of a site
for a Federal Building. In paragraph 7 of the Complaint the
purposes or objects of defendant Corporation as stated in its
11
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Articles of Incorporation are to acquire, hold, dispose of
such real and personal property as may be conveyed to acquire
by said Corporation for the benefit of the members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious society,
for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public
worship.
The powers of defendant Corporation of the President,
being a corporation sole, is thus defined in U.C.A. 1953,
16-7-6, subsection ( l ) :
' T o acquire and possess, by donation, gift, bequest,
devise or purchase, and to hold and maintain property,
real, personal and mixed, and to grant, sell, convey, rent
or otherwise dispose of the same as may be necessary
to carry on or promote the objects of the corporation."
To say that one of the objects of the Corporation of the
President is the purchase of a site for a Federal Building is
to stretch the language of such corporation and the provision
of the statute above cited far beyond the breaking point. No
less an authority than the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that the funds held by the Church are trust funds
which must be used for the benefit of its members and not
otherwise. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 481, 140 U.S. 665, 35 L. Ed. 592.
It may or may not be that the funds which are to be used to
assist in the purchase of a Federal Building are part of the
funds involved in the foregoing decision. If such funds are
the funds involved in the foregoing decision, the purpose for
which the same may be used is res adjudicata, if not, the doctrine of stare decisis applies. In either event to hold that
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-6 empowers the Corporation of the President
12
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to use the trust funds held by it to assist in the purchase of
a Federal Building constitutes a taking of the property of the
beneficiaries of such trust fund in violation of the provisions
of Section 22 of Article One of the Constitution of Utah, and
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
In their respective briefs, the defendant corporation of
the President (see its Brief page 36) and Zions Securities (see
its Brief page 28) commit such defendants to the position that
the giving of several hundred thousand dollars toward the
purchase of a Federal Building is an act of charity. The
opinion rejects such theory and bases its opinion on a strictly
commercial basis, that is to say to advance the financial interests
of the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities. The
defendants do not make the claim that the money to be spent
is for the purpose of aiding them financially and if that is
the purpose, then under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, such a purpose is condemned by law in that it is the
duty of public officers to select a site for a public building
at a place which best serves the public interest without being
influenced by a purpose intended to serve special interests.

POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT DESIGNATE THE PURPOSES FOR
WHICH HIS DONATION TO THE CHURCH WAS GIVEN
AND THAT, THEREFORE, SUCH DONOR HAS NO
RIGHT TO DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE
MONEY SO GIVEN SHALL BE USED.
13
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While neither appellant, Jesse B. Stone, nor appellants
Fausetts, allege in their pleadings that they placed any limitation on the donation that they made to the Church, they do
allege that they have an interest in the trust fund held by the
Corporation of the President which is alleged to be the owner
of the defendant Zions Securities Corporation, which being
the allegations the court must assume the same as true. In
light of the fact that the Corporation of the President, as
stated in its Articles of Incorporation, will use the properly
it might acquire for the benefit of the members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious society, "for
the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public
worship," nothing would be gained by the donor stating how
the donation should be used. The trustee of the fund having
stated the purposes for which the donation will be used,
there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the
property must be used for the stated purpose. Moreover, under
the provisions of the statute, U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-1, and 16-7-6,
property held by a corporation sole may lawfully be used only
for "the benefit of religion, for works of charity and public
worship." If the corporation sole uses the property held by it
for any purpose other than that provided in its Articles and
as provided by the law pursuant to which it is permitted to
exist, such corporation not only fails to keep its promises to
the donor, but also fails to keep within the powers conferred
upon it by law. While a beneficiary may not direct how a trust
fund shall be used by the trustee, he may prevent the trustee
of the fund from disposing of the same in violation of the
terms of the trust. In support of such view we direct the
attention of the Court to some of the cases cited by Counsel
14
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for the Corporation of the President, among which are the
following:
Nancy v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W. 874, 15
L.R.A. 801;
Kittinger v. Churchill, 292 N.Y.S. 35;
Skinner v. Holmes, 133 N J . Eq.. 593, 33 A.(2d)
819.
See also brief of Zions Securities, pages 7 to 10.
These cases do hold that one who ceases to be a member of
a church may not be heard to complain as to the manner in
which the church property is being used, but on the contrary
a member of the church as a beneficiary may maintain an action
to enjoin those who have control of the fund from using the
same in a manner contrary to the purposes for which the fund
is being held. Other authorities and cases of similar import
are cited on page 48 of Appellant's original Brief.
It may be that plaintiff Stone may not be heard to complain if the fund is misused, but in its opinion the Court
disposed of the case as if the Fausetts were parties to the
action, and as such be heard to raise the question of the manner
in which the Corporation of the President is using the trust
fund. Indeed, if the beneficiaries of a fund may not maintain
an action to prevent the misuse of a trust fund, it follows
that the trustee may use such fund as meets its fancy. The
Court cites the cases of Wemrne v. Noyes, (Ore.) 294 Pac. 602,
incorrectly cited as being in 194 Pac; Clark v. Oliver, 91
Va. 421, 22 S.E. 175; Restatement of Trusts, (2d) Sec. 391;
Dickey v. Volker, 62 A.L.R. 858, erroneously cited as being
in 11 S.W. (2d) 279- As we read these cases and authorities
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they make against and not in support of the statement in the
opinion.
To understand the purport of the holdings in the case of
Wemme v. Noyes, supra, it is necessary to read the other
Oregon case therein cited where the same question was before
the court. We especially direct the attention of the Court to
the cases of Wemme v. First Church of Christ, 219 Pac. 618,
and 237 Pac. 674. In these cases the distinction between
Public and Private Trusts is discussed. It is held that in case
of a Public Trust an action to enforce a compliance with its
terms must be brought by the Attorney General, and in case
of a Private Trust such an action must be brought by a beneficiary of the trust. The trust here involved is, under all of the
authorities as we read them, a private trust. It is no concern
of the Attorney General how the Corporation of the President
shall dispose of its funds, but it is of the concern of the beneficiaries of such fund how the same shall be disposed of.
To review the facts and the law in the other cases and
authorities cited on page 3 under Note 2 of the opinion will
unduly lengthen this Brief. We earnestly urge the Court to
re-examine the question of right of a member of the L.D.S.
Church to maintain this action, and having done so we believe
the Court will not be able to escape the conclusion that the
law there discussed applies to Public Trusts, and not to Private
Trusts, and that a beneficiary of a Private Trust such as this
may maintain an action to enjoin the trustee from disposing
of the property held by him in a manner not provided by
the terms of the trust and in accord with the law providing
for the purposes for which such fund may be used. On page
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48 of our original Brief will be found other authorities dealing
with public and private trusts and by whom its terms may be
enforced.

POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE IS
NO DOUBT THAT THE CHURCH CAN LEGALLY PURCHASE AND SELL PROPERTY AS ANY OTHER PROPERTY OWNER, AND IT CAN USE ANY LEGITIMATE
MEANS TO PERSUADE A BUYER TO PURCHASE FROM
IT.
It has repeatedly been held by this Court that a corporation has such powers and only such powers as have been
conferred upon it by law, which include such pov/ers as are
necessary for the exercise of the powers conferred.
Republic v. Price, 65 Utah 57, 234 Pac. 231.
Wilde v. Emma Copper Co., 58 Utah 524, 200 Pac.
517.
The same is true of Municipal Corporations.
American Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292
Pac. 249;
Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 55, 48 Pac. 41;
Salt Lake City v. Nutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 Pac. 234;
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 Pac. (2d)
591.
A corporation sole is a creature of statutory law the same as
a corporation created for profit. The powers of a corporation
sole are defined in U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-1. Thus a corporation
sole may be formed for the purpose of acquiring, holding or
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disposing of church or religious society property for "the
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public worship
in the manner hereinafter provided."
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-6, provides that a corporation sole shall
have power
" (1) To acquire and possess, by donation gift, bequest,
devise or purchase and to hold and maintain
property, real, personal and mixed, and to grant,
sell, convey, rent or otherwise dispose of the same
as may be necessary to carry on or promote the
objects of the corporation/'
Thus, a corporation sole is limited to disposing of its property
for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public
worship. To say that the expenditure of several hundred
thousand dollars of religious society property to induce the
officers of the Federal Government to select a site for a Federal
Building is neither a power conferred upon a corporation sole,
nor is it necessary to so use its funds in order to exercise the
conferred powers. In our somewhat extended research we have
been unable to find any adjudicated case or other authority
so holding. The law announced in the cases of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, supra, is to the
contrary.
POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO MATTER HOW GREAT THE BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED OR
THE DETRIMENT TO BE SUFFERED BY THE CHURCH
IN THIS TRANSACTION NEITHER WOULD REDOUND
TO THE BENEFIT OR DETRIMENT OF THE COMMIS-
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SIONERS AS INDIVIDUALS, AND FURTHER FINDING
THAT: THUS THE 'CONFLICT OF INTEREST" REASON
FOR BIDDING CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE CITY
AND OFFICIALS INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECTMATTER DOES NOT EXIST HERE BECAUSE IT IS UNIFORMLY HELD THAT THE INTEREST REFERRED TO IN
SUCH A STATUTE MEANS THAT THE OFFICIAL MUST
HAVE A PERSONAL AND PECUNIARY INTEREST IN
THE SUBJECTMATTER.
In making the foregoing statement the Court apparently
overlooked a number of authorities cited in Appellant's original
Brief, among them Vol. 2, Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
Sec. 773, page 1143, where it is said:
"It is impossible to lay down any general rule
defining the nature of the interest of a municipal officer
which comes within the operation of these principals.
Any direct or indirect interest in the subjectmatter is
sufficient to taint the contract with illegality if the
interest be such as to offset the judgment and conduct
of the officers in the making of the contract or in its
performance."
In the case of Miller v. City of Martinez, et al., 28 Cal.
App. (2d) 364, 83 Pac. (2nd) 519, it is said that the interest
of the public officer need not be financial, but may be any
interest which would tend to prevent him from exercising
absolute loyalty and undivided allegiance to the best interests
of the city. To the same effect is Clark v. Utah Construction Co.,
51 Idaho 867, 8 Pac. (2d) 454. We have discussed this phase
of the case at some length under Point Four, pages 31 to 42
of our original Brief, and no useful purpose will be served by
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repeating what is there said. However, as we read the authorities cited in footnote 4 on page 4 of the opinion of the Court
the same do not support what is claimed for them.
Thus, it is said in Sec. 29.97, page 390 of the 3rd Ed. of
McQuillin Municipal Corporations that municipal officers and
agents are held by the courts to a strict accountability in their
dealings with one on behalf of the corportion. In 63 C.J.S.,
Mun. Corp., Sec. 991(b), it is said, and numerous cases are
cited, that wherein a municipality is brought into contractual
relations with firms or companies or which councilman or other
city officer was a member, stockholders or employee, the courts
have usually applied the general doctrine to the undoing of
such contracts just as though the officers were individually
interested. If the beneficiaries of a trust fund are not interested
in the same, it may be inquired, who are interested? They are
the ones who own the fund. The only interest that the trustees,
as such, have in the fund is to carry out its provisions. On page
3 of the opinion, the Court directs attention to a provision
of the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation of The
President as recited in the Brief of the Corporation to the
effect that the Corporation may grant, sell, rent, mortgage,
exchange or otherwise dispose of any part or all of said property. While such provisions are probably not properly before
the Court, the disposal of the assets of the Corporation by its
trustee is not inconsistent with the ownership by the beneficiaries. If any proceeds are derived from the grant, sale, rent,
mortgage, exchange or other disposition of the property, such
proceeds continue to belong to the beneficiaries.
It is true that some of the adjudicated cases where contracts with a city have been declared invalid involve matters
20
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wherein one or more officers or agents of a city have a direct
pecuniary interest. Many statutes so provide. However, to
limit the disqualification to monetary interests would be to
ignore the very essence of the evils sought to be prevented.
The authorities are all agreed that the purpose of the law is
to prevent a public officer from putting himself in a position
which will subject him to the temptation of acting in any
manner other than in the best interests of the public. The
authorities are cited on pages 32 to 42 of our original Brief.
In our original Brief under Point Seven, pages 45 to 49,
we have discussed the monetary interest that the members of
the Mormon Church have in the trust fund held by the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities Corporation,
defendants. Probably no useful purpose will be served by an
attempt to enlarge upon what is there said. If effect be given
to prevent the evils sought to be avoided by the provisions,
such laws as U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38, it is necessary that the act
be applied to matters that are not monetary. It has frequently
been said that the people of Utah, especially those who are
members of the dominant Church, are a peculiar people. If
it be meant by such expression that the belief in the infallibility
of their leaders and their duty to comply with their desires is
inquired into, there can be no doubt that the members of the
L.D.S. Church are unique.
It is alleged in paragraph 21(b) that one of the cardinal
principles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
is that its members shall comply with the announced desires of
the leaders of that Church, and particularly such desires of its
President and his Counselors.
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'That when it was conceived that the property owned
by defendant City might be acquired for the purpose
of having erected thereon a Federal Building, defendant
Gus P. Backman, a member of said Church, was called
upon by the leaders of said Church to aid in undertaking to acquire the above mentioned city property,
and to get the consent of the proper officers of the
United States to consent to accept the same as a site
for a Federal Building. That when it became known
that the Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the leaders
of said Church desired to purchase the above mentioned city property as a site for a Federal Building,
the defendant City Commissioners proceeded to have
the property appraised," etc.
This Court will doubtless take judicial notice of the fact that
the President of the L.D.S. Church, who is also the Corporation
of the President, is the Prophet, Seer and Revelator of that
Church, and as such is the representative of God on this earth.
If the Court may not take judicial notice of such fact, plaintiff
is entitled to show that to be the fact under the pleadings
above quoted. Under such allegations, plaintiff is entitled to
show and will show that at each semi-annual Conference of
the members of the L.D.S. Church it is, in effect, proposed
by the person presiding at such Conference that whoever is
then President of the Church be sustained as the prophet, seer,
revelator and trustee in trust of said Church, and that "those
who are in favor of so doing signify it by raising your hand,
and that when you do vote affirmatively, that you covenant
to sustain the person so voted for/'
Under the pleading above mentioned plaintiff is entitled
to show and will show that it is the established doctrine of said
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Church that its members are morally obligated to comply with
the announced desires of the Church in both spiritual matters
as well as temporal matters in which the Church may have an
interest. That being so, the members of a City Council who
are members of the L.,D.S. Church are clearly placed in the
position which subjects them to conflicting duties, and exposes
them to the temptation of acting in a manner other than in the
best interest of the public. Indeed, the allegiance of one to
his Church far transcends any monetary interest that one may
have in a transaction.

POINT EIGHT
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "TO
ASSUME THAT THEY (the Commissioners) WOULD BE
TRAY THEIR PUBLIC TRUST AND SUBVERT THE
INTERESTS OF THE CITY TO THOSE OF THE CHURCH
WOULD REQUIRE THE CONJECTURE THAT THEY
ARE BENT ON WRONGDOING AND VIOLATING
THEIR OATH OF OFFICE. SUCH CONJECTURE THE
LAW WILL NOT INDULGE, BUT IN THE ABSENCE
OF A SPECIFIC CHARGE TO THE CONTRARY, RIGHT
CONDUCT IS ALWAYS PRESUMED."
If we look at the other side of the situation, it may be
said with even greater force that:
"To assume that they (the Commissioners) would
betray their covenant with and duty to their Church and
subvert the interests of the Church to those of the
City, would require the conjecture that they are bent
on turning their backs on their Church and violating
their covenant with the Church and endangering their
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standing with their Church and their rewards in the
hereafter; that they ignore the doctrine of their Church
which in effect teaches .that the Will of their President
is the Will of God.
Such conjecture the law will not indulge. The purpose of the
law is to prevent public officers who are placed in a position
such as that of the defendant Commissioners who are members
of the L.D.S. Church from participating in a contract involving
the sale of the city property to the Church. That the Church
had an interest in the deal is evident because it is, according
to the allegation of the Complaint, expending several hundred
thousand dollars toward the purchase of the site. Moreover,
it is very strange that the Church should participate in a transaction by a series of circuitous transactions in an attempt to
get the title to the site in the United States. The orderly
procedure would be to have the City contract with and convey
the property directly to the United States.
POINT NINE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST REASON FOR FORBIDDING CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE CITY AND OFFICIALS INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECTMATTER DOES NOT EXIST HERE BECAUSE IT IS UNIFORMLY HELD THAT
THE INTEREST REFERRED TO IN SUCH STATEMENT
MEANS THAT THE OFFICERS MUST HAVE A PERSONAL PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER.
What we have said under Points 7 and 8 have a bearing
on this Point, and we adopt the same in support hereof without
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repeating what is there said. We, however, direct the attention
of the Court to the fact that our statute, unlike many others,
makes no reference to either personal or monetary interests.
To say that the statute means personal financial interests is to
read in the statute a meaning that is not there. The words
directly or indirectly interested expressly excludes the thought
that the officer must have a direct personal interest. If the
legislature had intended the interest to be monetary interest
only, it would have so provided. Whether the allegations of
the Complaint above mentioned and the evidence which
plaintiff intended to introduce in support thereof be viewed
in light of the provision of our statute or the common law,
a member of the City Council, who is also a member of the
L.D.S. Church and as such believes that the President of his
Church is the emissary of God on this earth, cannot reasonably
escape the conclusion that his obligation to his Church requires
that he comply with the wishes of his President. To hold
otherwise would be to emasculate the provisions of Section
10-6-38, U.C.A. 1953, as applied to the pleaded facts in this
case.
POINT TEN
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
APPLICATION OF THE EXTENSION OF THE RULE
AGAINST CONFLICT OF INTEREST APPLIED TO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SHOWN WOULD GO FAR BEYOND THE EVILS AGAINST WHICH IT IS DIRECTED
AND WOULD LIKELY CREATE EVILS OF ITS OWN.
As heretofore argued under Point Nine, it is not an extension of the rule against interests to give effect to the allegations
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of the Complaint and the evidence which plaintiff intends to
offer in support thereof. It is the function of the court to
construe the law.as passed by the legislative branch of government, and not to detremine whether or not it is a good law.
Moreover, if there are evils which may arise by preventing
public officers from participating in making contracts with
the President of their Church to whom such officers own allegiance because he is the Prophet, Seer and Reveiator, and the
representative of God on this earth, such evil is an incident
to our democratic system of government, and may not be
discarded because compliance with the will of the President
of the Church may bring about better results.
POINT ELEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MEMBERSHIP IN THE CHURCH UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED HERE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN
AND AS BEING PROHIBITED BY SECTION 10-6-34,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
We have heretofore discussed this phase of the case, and
shall not repeat what has been said, except to observe that
it is alleged in pargraph 21, Sec. (a) "That the defendant
commissioners seek to realize some benefits from such transactions." (The sale of the property). Such allegations must
be taken as true. Plaintiff has a right to try this case on his
theory.
POINT TWELVE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISION OF SECTION 10-8-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
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1953, DOES NOT APPLY TO A SALE OF THE PROPERTY
HERE INVOLVED.
In the opinion of the Court it is said Section 10-8-8, U.C.A.
1953, does not apply to the property at First South and State
Streets because it names streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards,
sidewalks, airports and public grounds. It is held that the doctrine of ejustem geneus excludes the city property here involved
because it is not of the same kind as the eunmerated prop
erties. The mentioned properties are all real estate. It would
seem that there is a greater reason for formal binding steps
to be taken in the sale of property used to house city officers
engaged in the performance of governmental functions than in
securing the vacating of the enumerated public properties.
There are numerous cases dealing with when the above mentioned doctrine should be applied, but to review the same
would extend this Brief beyond reasonable limits. In our view
the procedure followed by the City in its attempt to dispose
of the property at First South and State Streets is fatally
defective for reasons other than the failure to pass an ordinance. Before taking up a discussion of such other reasons
we direct the Court to the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-2,
which provides that if the manner of exercising the power of
the City Commission is not specifically pointed out, the Commission "may provide by ordinance the manner and details"
necessary for the full exercise of such power. In this case the
City did not by Ordinance or at all specifically point out the
manner and details necessary for the full exercise of the power
to sell the property at First South and State Streets. Even if
the power to sell the city property at First South and State
Streets may be exercised by the passage of a Resolution, such
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Resolution must meet the requirements enumerated by McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Vol 2, page 672, which
we have set out on page 26 of our original Brief. Among such
requirements are that:
"It must be precise, definite and certain in expression.
It must be enacted in good faith, in the public interest
alone and designated to enable the corporation to perform its true functions as a local government organ/'

POINT THIRTEEN
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE
IS NO ALLEGATION THAT THERE WAS ANY IMPROPRIETY IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CITY PROPERTY WAS SOLD.
Plaintiff has in substance alleged in paragraph 21 of his
Complaint that the property at First South and State Streets
is being used to house the employees ofthe City who are engaged in the performance of governmental functions, and
that no provision has been made for providing other places
for such employees. The purported bid made by the Chamber
of Commerce is set out in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's Complaint.
In its Motion for Leave to File an Amendment to the Complaint plaintiff alleged that there was no lawful publication
of notice to sell the property. No lawful bid was made for the
property; that the purported bid did not comply with the
Notice; that there was no lawful acceptance of the purported
bid, etc. Obviously, these allegations show that there were
subterfuges and impropriety in the manner in which the City
is attempting to dispose of its property at First South and State
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Streets, and that plaintiff should be permitted to produce his
evidence in support of his allegations.
These allegations if and when established by the evidence
will entitle plaintiff to prevail, and the Court is in error in
assuming that these allegations are not true.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing Petition for a Rehearing and the Brief
in support thereof we have called the attention of the Court
to allegations in the Complaint which we believe may be readily
established by competent evidence, and to the law applicable
to facts alleged in the Complaint. The Court has apparently
either misconceived the purport of the pleaded facts, or concluded that the same are insufficient to entitle plaintiff to any
relief. We have carefully read the authorities cited by the
Court and believe that if the Court will re-examine such law
in the light of the pleaded facts, the Court will be forced to
come to a different conclusion.
We are filing this Petition and Brief not only in our effort
to seek a different decision in this case, but with the thought in
mind that if some of the conclusions reached in this case are
permitted to become the established law in this jurisdiction,
they may well result in permitting public property and trust
funds to be dissipated without any means to prevent such
unfortunate results.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
BURTON W. MUSSER
Attorneys for Appellants
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